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I. INTRODUCTION
The opening of new business opportunities in Eastern Europe
has been documented by volumes of literature devoted to legal
aspects of foreign investment in that region, most of which
examines the Soviet Union and Hungary. This literature, composed
of several books and many articles, has been followed by
publications originating in Eastern Europe, the United States, Great
Britain, and other countries containing translations of certain laws
in Eastern Europe. These publications are devoted to providing up-
to-date information to prospective investors or lawyers involved in
preparatory work or negotiations.'
This has been followed by growing numbers of conferences and
seminars devoted to investment in Eastern Europe. Several
American law firms have opened offices in East European capitals,
the majority of them in Moscow. Periodicals increasingly publish
articles devoted to changes in this region and the experiences of
existing investors.
1. See generally PECHOTA, USSR & CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN LEGAL MATERIALS
(1990); OSAKWE, JOINT VEmRES WrIH THE SoviET UNION (Butterworths Legal Pub. 1990).
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All of the information published for lawyers concentrates on
statutes affecting joint ventures. These publications cover most of
the rules relating to foreign investment in Eastern European
countries. They also focus on the problems of emerging securities
markets, corporation regulations, property law, currency transfer
problems, and taxation. Some writers go deeper, trying to explore
the entire set of legal rules important to prospective investments.
Currently, American lawyers who want to acquaint themselves with
the laws on foreign investment in Eastern Europe have no problem
finding literature published in English representing high quality
explanations of current law, future trends, and developments.
What may be missing is an understanding that Eastern Europe,
particularly the Soviet Union, represents a very different legal,
social, and economic environment. This is especially true in this
period of vast transition. Many of the problems investors face in
Eastern Europe come from underestimating the significance of that
environment.2 For that reason, focusing on broader significant
problems for foreign investment, rather than on easily available
technical rules relating to joint ventures, is advisable.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN EASTERN EUROPE
A. The Initial Steps
First attempts to attract foreign investment to East European
countries took place almost a quarter century ago. At that time, no
one could have foreseen the changes which were to take place
beginning in the late 1980s and continuing today. In 1967,
Yugoslavia passed legislation permitting joint ventures. This first
step was followed by Hungary and Romania in 1972, Poland in
1976, Bulgaria in 1980, Czechoslovakia in 1985, and the Soviet
Union in 1987. However, since that time, the respective legislation
has been either replaced by new laws, or at least substantially
amended. It should be mentioned that in some countries western
2. Soviet Ventures are Losing Appeal for U.S. Business, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1991, at Al,
col. 3.
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companies gained contractual rights earlier, with the consent and
full support of communist governments. This resulted in the
introduction of foreign philosophies into the communist economies.
Acceptance of foreign investment was a step out of the
ideological foundations of the communist system. Governments
which forbade or substantially restricted the possibility of economic
activity by their own subjects permitted foreign entities to operate
in their territory.3 This was probably one of the reasons for putting
several restrictions on foreign investors concerning the percentage
of foreign shares in joint ventures and the nationality of the top
executive officers. These restrictions could also have been an
overestimation of western investors' interest in entering East
European markets as well as xenophobic fears of foreigners coming
from the West, who were treated with more than suspicion.4
However, the poor performance of communist economies and
the lack of resources for the purchase of western technology
compelled a search for some other mode of attracting hard currency
and modem technology. The less than moderate interest of foreign
investors caused the lifting of many restrictions, or foregoing the
application of existing ones to bring in foreign capital. Still, the
amount of foreign investment in East European economies was
next to nothing. Of course, the situation varied among countries.
Hungary managed to secure the biggest portion of foreign
investment. This was due to several factors, most significantly, the
better condition of the Hungarian economy resulting from
economic reforms enacted there. Poland attracted many petty
investors, mostly of Polish origin. The Soviet Union made a few
huge deals with big western companies. In some cases, obtaining
the advantages of first presence in the Soviet market resulted in
initial showings of modest profits.
3. Osakwe, The Death of Ideology in Soviet Foreign Investment Policy, A Clinical
Examination of the Soviet Joint Venture Law of 1987,22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1989).
4. Brady & Boyle, Combustion Engineering's Dislocated Joint Venture, Bus. WK., Oct. 22,
1990, at 49-50. These phobias are not uncommon even today. See Kremlin Accuses Banks in West
of a Plot, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1991, at A3, col. 4.
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B. Governmental and Economic Reform
The end of the eighties brought revolutionary changes all over
Eastern Europe. Free elections and a desire to transform command
economies into market economies were the most visible features of
that time. The scope of desired changes and the tempo of
transformation were different throughout Eastern Europe. In
Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, elections were won by
opposition groups, leaving the former communist parties with only
about ten percent of the votes. These three countries tended toward
a complete rejection of their communist past and a transformation
of their governmental and economic systems toward Western
European patterns in the hope of joining the European Economic
Community. Still, among this group, passage of reforms varied,
particularly in the area of economics, where Poland moved ahead
of Hungary and Czechoslovakia.5
Results of elections in the Soviet Union, Romania, and Bulgaria
differed and left, at least initially, the power in the hands of former
communists. The scope of planned and desired changes in these
countries seems to be smaller, tending to transform the system by
finding some point where features of both systems could meet.
Nevertheless, changes which have taken place or are currently
under way in these countries cannot be underestimated.
C. Impediments to Reform
Initially, plans for transformation were very optimistic. Then
several contradictions were discovered, making the path of reform
much slower and more difficult.
The first contradiction relates to political change. Introduction
of a democratic system requires lifting political control over the
activities of citizens and their organizations and transferring of
power to elected bodies. But this loosening of restrictions is
immediately followed by the emergence of centrifugal tendencies,
5. Harden & Battiata, EastEuropeans Weigh Costs of Change; MoveAwayfrom Communism
More Difficult than Many Expected, Wash. Post, Dec. 24, 1990, § 1, at Al (final ed.).
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endangering, in the case of a multi-national state, the existence of
that state. This is particularly visible in the Soviet Union,
Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. Even in unitary states, freshly
freed local governments show a proclivity for striping the central
government of as many powers as possible to gain as much local
autonomy as they can. This is the typical reaction to the communist
system and strong centralism, in which even minor decisions
required the consent of central authorities. Many localities felt
exploited by central government, which was frequently identified
with bureaucracy and authorities located in the distant capital of the
country. To keep the country together the central governments
resorted to more autocratic methods, which ended the move toward
democracy and the advantages of a democratic system. The
tendency toward retrenchment of autocratic power and central
government are clearly visible in the recent coup attempt in the
Soviet Union and the civil confrontations in Yugoslavia. That is the
first contradiction which may result, on the broader plane, in shifts
from broad democracy to some form of autocratic government.
The second contradiction relates to the economy. A net of
government-owned enterprises was built in the communist countries
on the basis of a full monopoly over the enterprises in a market
designed by central planners. Introduction of a market economy,
however, assumes freedom of economic decision making by
enterprises and abolishment of the central government's economic
bureaucracy.
However, once existing enterprises feel free of central
government control they tend to behave like monopolies elsewhere:
they abuse their position, raise the prices, lower the quantity and
quality of production or services, and try to impose harsh
conditions on all of their customers. To counter that effect, it is
either necessary for the central government bureaucracy to again
assume control or to introduce competition by extensive
importation of goods.
Additionally, there could be economic difficulty due to the lack
of resources such that the only feasible option is for the central
government to resume control. This tendency is clearly visible in
the Soviet Union, as a reaction to a disorganized market, and also
628
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explains the slow passage of reforms in other countries and the
fears of governments to renounce control over prices.
A third contradiction is that between high expectations of the
society and the necessity of sacrifice to make economic reform
possible. Transition of power to opposition groups is followed by
high expectations of the society. Simultaneously, reforms toward
a market economy will result in lowering the standard of living of
most working people, causing visible polarization of the society.
Probably the only solution is for a new government to move
forward with reforms at maximum speed to make use of the
moment of euphoria. Later, society may not accept the necessity to
sacrifice. This explains the slow path of reforms in Czechoslovakia
and Hungary. Poland, on the other hand, used the moment of social
euphoria to put its society through the most painful changes.
The last contradiction is the one between traces of communism,
or utopian socialist ideology, in the minds of employees and the
requirements of efficient management of modern business. This is
particularly important from the prospective investors' point of view.
Employees of government enterprises frequently organized into
powerful trade unions. These unions have a tendency to treat the
enterprise as a kind of community property of all the employees.
Unions also tend to provide substantial employee influence on
personnel decisions concerning top executive positions within the
enterprise. Polish law concerning government-owned enterprise
gives employee representatives broad powers in matters relating to
the appointment and removal of directors of the enterprise. 6 Soviet
statutes provide for the election of foremen by brigades in
enterprises.7 As a result of such employee control, management's
6. Ustawa o przedsiebiorstwach panstwowych (Law on State's Enterprises) Dziennik Ustaw
1987 No. 35, § 201 (last amended in 1990). See Dziennik Ustaw 1990 No. 17, § 99 (The director
(chief executive) of the state's enterprise is appointed by the so-called "employees council" (rada
pracownicza)). See Ustawa o samorzadzie zalogi przedsiebiorstwa panstwowego (Law on Employees'
Self Government of the State's Enterprises) Dziennik Ustaw 1981 No. 24, § 123 (as amended). Rules
set up in these two statutes do not apply to nongovernment-owned enterprises in Poland.
7. Zakon SSSR o predpriatiakh v SSSR (Law on Enterprises in USSR) art. 20, § 2 (Ved.
S'ezda Nar. Dep. SSSR [VSNDSSSR] 1990 No. 25, item. 460). See Life in a Soviet Factory,
ECONOMIST, Dec. 22, 1990, at 21-24.
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main concern is to please employees. Most of the enterprises suffer
from over-employment, which hinders attempts to cure the
enterprise's performance. Over-employment also hinders
privatization attempts. Employees are afraid of reductions and lay-
offs by new owners. Therefore, during appraisals of the enterprise's
property, employees insist on the inclusion of all the pieces of
property, including old machinery, which leads to a total valuation
of assets far exceeding the expectations of prospective investors.
Calculation of enterprise assets and pricing of shares causes intense
emotional reactions. In Hungary, the price on the first state-owned
companies to be sold through public offering was far too low and
caused dismissal of the responsible minister, which substantially
delayed the whole process of privatization.8 This type of reaction
by employees is also visible in calls to privatize government-owned
enterprises by distributing shares among employees.
All of these contradictions can be overcome, and to some extent
have been overcome, in some Eastern European countries. For
example, it appears that at least Poland has overcome most of these
obstacles. On the other hand, this has lead to popular
dissatisfaction, as evidenced by the poor performance of the Prime
Minister in presidential elections (third place with less than twenty
percent of the votes), so the price for overcoming these obstacles
seems to be high. These contradictions substantially delay and
hinder the process of transformation in Eastern Europe toward
democracy and a free market and are probably most visible in
Soviet Union.
III. THE DRiVE TOWARD DEMOCRACY
Experience shows that a democratic society, by guaranteeing
the rights of citizens and providing mechanisms to decide disputes
with government by impartial tribunals, is a much better climate for
economic investment than systems based on autocracy. In this
respect, changes in Eastern Europe are of enormous importance.
8. Greenhouse, Paths to Capitalism: Remaking Eastern Europe-A Special Report; Year of
Economic Tumult Looms for Eastern Europe, N.Y. Tines, Dec. 31, 1990, § 1, at 1, col. 4 (late ed.).
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A. Expansion of Individual Rights
Abolishment of the privileged position of the communist party,
free elections, multi-party systems, and an independent judiciary
are only some of the achievements of countries in Eastern Europe.
Even in the Soviet Union, where the danger of disintegration is
most apparent and democratic tradition is almost nonexistent,
changes are enormous. Without delving too deeply into these
changes, this article identifies constitutional changes guaranteeing
citizens rights, introduction of the Committee of Constitutional
Supervision, broadening of judicial control over the acts of public
administration, and substantial changes in criminal procedure. It is
also worthwhile to note several laws relating to economic issues,
statutes relating to enterprises in the Soviet Union, property
problems, joint stock societies, and limited responsibility societies.
Some of these statutes have been translated into English and are
readily available.9
Among the newly guaranteed rights in the Soviet Union is the
protection of private property of individual citizens (called
"personal property"). This guarantee includes the right to use
personal property to carry on economic and other activities not
forbidden by law and the right to inherit. Property of corporations
(including that of joint stock companies) has been included into so-
called "collective ownership," which is now also under the
protection of law.
B. Altering the Judicial System
Several other new statutes introduced substantial changes in the
system of administering justice. The most significant seems to be
the changes in criminal procedure, providing the possibility of
limited introduction of jury trial (to be introduced by republican
legislation) and the introduction of the right to counsel during
investigation. Counsel may be present during questioning of a
9. See generally PECHOTA, supra note 1; Osakwe, supra note 1; BUTLERt, COLLEE
LEGISLATION OF THE USSR AND CONSTITUENT UNION REPUBucs (1988).
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suspect and, after the close of the investigation, can examine the
entire dossier of the case gathered by police or by the attorney's
office."0 New statutes guarantee independence of the judiciary and
obedience to their decisions, penalizing any attempt to influence or
disregard a court's decisions.11 Soviet citizens were also given the
right to strike," and censorship of the mass media has been
abolished. 3
C. Evidence of the Contradictions
These changes indicate a strong concern for and respect of
citizens' rights and liberties. On the other hand, one also finds
statutes exhibiting a repressive character, for example, the statute
on protection of the honor of the President of the Soviet Union,14
legislation concerning the legal regime in extraordinary situations
(marshal law),15 and legislation on the powers of internal troops
(which are subordinate to the Soviet Ministry of Interior) for the
protection of social order. 6 Anyone one who has studied the
Soviet Union for several years understands how fundamental these
pieces of legislation are.
D. Movement in the Soviet Union
Changes in the Soviet Union during perestroika have been
enormous. Their significance, both in the area of democratization
10. Osnovy ugolovnogo sudoproizvodstva SSSR i Soiuznykh Respublik (Fundamental
Principles of Criminal Procedure of the USSR and the Union Republics) §§ 9, 13, 22, 23, amended
by VSNDSSSR 1990 No. 16, item 272.
11. Zakon ob otvetstvennosti za neuvazhjenie k sudu (Law on Liability for Disregard for
Courts) Ved. Verkh. Soy. SSSR [VVSSSSR] 1989 No. 22, item 418. See VVSSSSR 1989 No. 9, item
223 (Laws relating to the organization of courts and position of judges).
12. Zakon o pariadke razreshenia kollektyvnyh trudovyh sporov (konfliktov) (Law on the
Procedure for the Settlement of Collective Labor Disputes (Conflicts)) VVSSSSR 1989 No. 18, item
342.
13. Zakon o pechati i drugikh sredstvakh massovoy informactsi (Law on Press and Other
Means of Mass Information) VSNDSSSR 1990 No. 26, item 492.
14. VSNDSSSR 1990 No. 22, item 391.
15. VSNDSSSR 1990 No. 15, item 250.
16. VSNDSSSR 1990 No. 14, item 233.
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and in the observance of individual. rights, cannot be exaggerated.
This is true for several reasons.
1. Reliance on the Republics
First, the legislation as noted above in Part Ill.C. has been
adopted by the Union. However, its implementation to a great
extent depends on the authorities of the different republics. Taking
into consideration the number of republics that are at odds with the
Union, one should not expect them to implement federal legislation
if they officially declare independence or broad autonomy with
plans for independence in the future. In the case of criminal
legislation, which is generally republican, its implementation
requires introduction in the republican legislatures. On the other
side of the coin, different republics have adopted many pieces of
legislation during their own drive towards democracy and a free
market, breaking away from a unified legal system. One can
distinguish several competing legal systems and conclude that the
law to be applied rests within the discretion of local authorities.
With the future of the Union unclear, it is difficult to rely on
existing legislation.
2. Unique Considerations in the Soviet System
It is quite important to realize that the role of the legal system
in Soviet tradition is different than in western society. This is the
legacy of the legal traditions of imperial Russia blended with
Marxist legal positivism. Law is treated more as a tool of
government than a set of superior rules equally binding people at
the top of government and at the bottom of society. The Russian
saying, "governing by means of the law," occupies the place
reserved in other societies for the rule of law.
In addition, the government, as the ultimate owner of most of
the property in the Soviet Union, has many ways of influencing the
citizen's behavior without resort to legal means. This can be done
through an adequate policy of appointments to different positions,
through an allocation of subsidies, or through the allocation of
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 4
scarce materials or goods. Also, respect for orders coming from
direct superior officers can be stronger than respect for rules of law
which no one is going to enforce. Persons experienced in doing
business in the Soviet Union would agree that a lot more can be
achieved through personal connections and an ability to approach
governmental officers than through legal means by resorting to the
courts.
A deep understanding of the different legal environment in the
Soviet Union can be crucial for any lawyer conducting business in
the Soviet Union or advising a client on Soviet business.
The Soviet Union represents a distinct legal culture with roots
in a civil law system. Because of the size of the Soviet Union,
even in the case of partial disintegration, its distinctiveness will
probably be maintained. It is a country which, at least now, seeks
its own means of improvement, not a total rejection of the past.
Actually, despite recent developments, this country, trapped by the
contradictions mentioned above, has relatively little room to
maneuver between concepts of western society and the traditional
communist system.
E. Progress in Poland
On the other side of undertaken reforms, one may point to
Poland, where features of economic and political crises were more
visible than in any other East European country. Nevertheless,
reforms in Poland went much further and faster than in other
countries.
1. Preliminary Reform Under the Old Communist Regime
It must be mentioned that several reforms toward
democratization and a free market economy in Poland had been
undertaken during the last years of the old regime. This occurred
before power was taken by anticommunist opposition. Poland
634
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already had a Constitutional Tribunal1 7 and the Supreme
Administrative Court" adjudicating on the legality of
administrative acts and ombudsmen. Poland also had freedom of
economic activity with a developed private sector of the economy,
particularly in agriculture. This looked like a good starting point for
substantial reform. However, other factors like hyperinflation and
huge foreign debt made the initial steps of the anticommunist
opposition government more difficult. Nevertheless, a program of
extensive reforms has been developed and its implementation has
begun.
2. Sweeping Governmental Changes in Poland
In the movement toward democracy, a great deal of emphasis
has been put on changes in institutions followed by a change of the
communist-dominated staff members. Huge reforms in local
government have taken place, followed by local elections. Political
police have been disbanded, and new laws on the power of the
police have been introduced.19 Criminal codes have been
substantially amended. Procuratura, an institution imported from
the Soviet Union, has been made subordinate to the Ministry of
Justice. Its powers have been restricted by the virtual elimination
of its authority to oversee obedience to the law in the entire
country (the equivalent of Soviet Procurators' supervision)." The
system of courts has been changed to provide full independence of
the judiciary.2" The scope of judicial review has been enlarged
leaving no so-called "government administrative acts" outside the
administrative court's scrutiny. Exceptions to this expansion of
17. See Garlicki, Constitutional Developments in Poland, 32 ST. Louis U.LJ. 713, 717
(1988).
18. See generally Wierzbowski & McCafrmy, Judicial Control ofAdministrative Authorities:
A New Development in Eastern Europe, 18 INT'L LAw. 645 (1984), reprinted in 8 MODERN LEGAL
SYSTEMS CYCLOPEDIA pt. I, ch. 6, § 2, at 8.110.5 (K. Redden rev. ed. 1991).
19. Dziermik Ustaw 1990 No. 30, § 179.
20. Ustawa o Prokuraturze RP (Law on Procuratura of Polish Republic) DziennikUstaw 1985
No. 31, § 138 (last amended in 1990).
21. Prawo o ustroju sadow powszechnych, Dziennik Ustaw 1985 No. 31, § 138; Ustawa o
Sadzie Najwyzszym (Law on Supreme Court) Dziennik Ustaw 1990 No. 26, § 153.
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judicial scrutiny include visas, asylum, expulsion of aliens, and
patents.2
2
3. The Role of Lech Walesa
All these changes do not substantially restructure the central
government as it was shaped at the moment of the transition of
power from the Communists to the Solidarity opposition. A new
structure of government should be adopted with the introduction of
a new constitution for Poland. This constitution should be drafted
and adopted after parliamentary elections in early fall. The election
of Walesa as President of Poland resulted in an attempt to
introduce a system of government based on a strong presidency,
following either the French or American model. A strong
presidential system may give the Polish President the power to
legislate by way of presidential decrees, as in France. Currently, the
President of Poland has no such power. Several times before the
elections, Walesa claimed the necessity for presidential legislative
power to accelerate reforms, which moved ahead too slowly,
because of the inefficiency of Parliament to quickly adopt new
laws.
The election of Walesa to the presidency will result in the
implementation of the new approach to the structure of central
government. For that reason, it seems that drafts of the Constitution
prepared by the existing Parliament can be treated simply as
interesting historical documents. Even without special prerogatives,
Walesa's role in the government has increased. This is due to his
very active role with respect to all the problems faced by the
government of Poland. Several drafts of new legislation have been
submitted reprimanding Parliament and developing, within the
structure of presidential office, a structure parallel to the existing
government. The development of hand-picked advisory bodies has
also aided in increasing President Walesa's power.
636
22. Ustawa o zmianie ustawy k.p.a. (Law on Amendment of the Law, Code of Administrative
Procedure) Dziennik Ustaw 1990 No. 34, § 201.
1991 / Foreign Investment in Eastern Europe
All of these developments indicate the tendency of the Polish
President, still a national hero, to introduce a new system of
government in which the key role is played by the President. These
ambitions cause different reactions, from deep appreciation, to
assertions that such a President will play the same role as that
assumed by the First Secretary of the Party under communist rule.
But broad open discussion about the shape of the future
government indicates how far Poland has moved from the regime
it was a couple years ago.
IV. THE TRANSFORMATION TO A MARKET ECONOMY
A. Difficulties in Transformation
The experts and politicians have apparently underestimated the
difficulty of transforming a command economy into a market
economy. Initial plans, like the Shatline Plan, were too optimistic.
The case of East Germany, where the possibility of huge amounts
of capital influx were far greater than in any other Communist
state, indicate the degree of difficulty. The painful example of a
thirty percent decrease in the standard of living in Poland during
the first few months of reform is clear confirmation of the
hardships. On the other hand, the thirty percent decrease could be
misleading because it does not take into consideration the
flourishing and vast bazaars not covered by government
statistics. 23
It must also be clearly stated that the difficulties of
transformation do not stem solely from the difficulty of replacing
central planning with market mechanisms. It seems that the greater
obstacles are the technological backwardness of Eastern European
economies and the lack of economic skills in the managerial
groups.
637
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B. Requirements for Achieving Transformation
Achieving transformation to a market economy in Eastern
European states requires the following steps:
1. Introduce freedom of economic activity
This has been introduced all over Eastern Europe except
in the Soviet Union where some restrictions still apply.
2. Abolish central planning
This has taken place in some countries. The task is not
as simple as it appears because, with the abolishment of
central planning, market mechanisms must take over and
provide operation of the economy. This reiluires abolition
of government regulation of prices and assumes free
decisions of economic subjects concerning the prices they
charge for their products or services.
Free pricing requires the existence of a competitive
market. In communist economies, prices were set by the
government, sometimes remaining at an artificially low
level with some strong government subsidies to cover the
difference between price and costs of operations. Some
governments now prefer smaller, more restricted reforms,
such as raising prices to match real costs while still
maintaining government control of prices.
Freeing prices inevitably results in their substantial rise,
which results in popular discontent. Abolishment of central
planning should be coupled with unrestricted ability to
convert local currency. With the exception of Poland,
having so-called internal convertability, unrestricted
convertible has not yet been fully achieved.
3. Introduce institutions which are necessary for the
existence of modern free market society, like a modern
banking system, securities market, stock and
commodities exchange, and a modem tax system
This requires not only much new legislation, but also
many institutional changes which cannot be achieved
without support from the outside. Introduction of new laws
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relating to banking, securities, and corporations has
occurred or is currently under way all over Eastern Europe.
Unfortunately, this is not yet immediately followed by
the development of such institutions. Lack of necessary
capital and experience substantially hinders the entire
process. The greatest difficulty is introducing a modern,
stable, tax system based on western experience.
4. Privatize the majority of government-owned
enterprises
This stage is still in its beginnings in Eastern Europe,
with Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia having some
introductory stages behind them. In spite of a lack of
special incentives to privatization in the Soviet Union, some
enterprises were purchased by foreign investors which, of
course, also results in their privatization.
Privatization is achieved in two parallel ways. The first
is by returning confiscated property to expropriated owners.
Special legislation has been passed in this respect in
Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. There are attempts to
introduce similar legislation in Poland. Only in this way
will some pieces of property be returned to former owners
or their heirs. Huge enterprises are kept outside of
reprivatization in this manner. For other pieces of
government property, other means of privatization are
prescribed. Secondly, in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and
Hungary privatization is mainly accomplished through
transformation of the existing enterprises into companies
solely owned by the government and a subsequent sale of
shares to either domestic or foreign investors.24 The lack
of necessary capital by domestic investors to purchase
shares must be overcome by the distribution of special
vouchers among the entire population, as in Poland and
24. See Law XIii of 1989 on the Transformation of Business Organizations and Companies
(available in English at Hungarian Chamber of Commerce); Law VII of 1990, Foundation of State
Property Agency with the Purpose of Management and Utilization of Property (publication in
Hungarian Rules of Law in Force, May 5, 1990); Ustawa o przywatyzacji przedsiebiorstw
panstwowych (Law on Privatization of State-owned Enterprises) Dziennik Ustaw 1990 No. 51, § 298.
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Czechoslovakia, or low interest loans as in Hungary. That
mode of privatization still creates disputes and respective
governments move slowly with transformation of other
enterprises.
C. Claims of the Opponents of Privatization
It is asserted that the idea of privatization does not lead to any
advantages for a national economy. It is claimed that the sale price
is usually far below the actual value of the privatized property.
Opponents also urge that having a vast army of petty shareholders,
each owning a few shares, leads to a new edition of utopian
socialism and not an economy of contemporary western-style
companies. These fears lead to a search for some alternative plans,
like the transformation of shares into several mutual funds, which
would play the role of holding companies and run the economy
during the transitory period. Individual investors should be the
shareholders of these funds.5
The process of privatization also seems to be hindered by
organized employees of government-owned enterprises. These
organizations fear that privatization will result in layoffs and will
end employee control over management of enterprises. All over
Eastern Europe, employees gained broad powers concerning
management of state owned enterprises. These powers would, of
course, come to an end with privatization of these enterprises.
All of these problems delay fast, full scale, privatization. As a
result, East European economies are still dominated by state
owned, inefficiently managed, state enterprises. In spite of all that
has been said about privatization, the role of privatized enterprises
in East European economies is still slight.
640
25. Polan4 Pioneer of Capitalism, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1991, at A22, col. 1.
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V. THE ROLE OF FOREIGNERS
A. A Continuation of Old Programs
To some extent, opening foreign investment by current East
European governments can be seen as a continuation from the first
openings to foreign capital made by communist governments in the
1970s. This phenomenon is quite easy to explain. East European
countries passed through a period of fast political and democratic
change, but their economies did not and could not undergo any
such revolutionary change. Changes in economies are always much
slower, particularly when bureaucratic orders have to be replaced
by naturally-grown market mechanisms.
Of course, the role envisioned for private investment by
communist governments is very different from the role assumed by
postcommunist authorities. Communist governments saw foreign
investment as a convenient way of achieving some goals within the
existing economy, goals they were not able to achieve by
themselves.
These goals were, or still are, expressed in laws relating to
foreign investments. A good example of that approach is the Polish
Foreign Investment Law, adopted in 1988 by the last Polish
communist-dominated Parliament. This has been replaced by a new
law without restrictions. The 1988 law required permits for foreign
investments and indicated that the permit should be issued only
when the business activity ensured (1) the introduction of modem
technologies and management methods into the national economy,
(2) a supply of goods and services for export, (3) the improvement
in the supply of modem and high quality products and services for
domestic market, and (4) the protection of the environment.2"
The preamble to the decree of the President of the Soviet Union
on foreign investment in the USSR provides:
In order to activate the participation of the USSR in world
economic relations and thereby to achieve a more complete
satisfaction of the country's needs in production and
26. Dziennik Ustaw 1990 No. 41, § 325.
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services ... [it is necessary to attract] additional material
and financial resources, [and] advanced foreign technology
and management experience in the form of foreign
investment.27
Both current Soviet and old Polish laws indicate that drafters
intended to achieve some goals with the assistance of foreign
investors, but did not intend to wholly open the market to foreign
investment. Additionally, the requirement of special permits
indicated the active role of government bureaucracy in the
evaluation and admission of prospective investors. Similar (but
more general and vague) solutions can be found in the
Czechoslovakian law of 1990.2
B. Breaking Away from Old Regulations
Current Hungarian regulation29 and the new Polish regulation
both reject the idea of the necessity of obtaining any special permit
for foreign investment, except in the case of a few narrowly
constructed activities. This is an expression of the willingness to
open their domestic markets to foreign investment and td restrict
the role of government bureaucracy in the economy.
1. The Effect of Competition
One can observe the competition between Hungary and Poland
in the area of attracting foreign business. This competition results
not only in the lifting of restrictions on foreign investment, but also
in the introduction of incentives to attract foreign investors. To this
point, Hungary seems to be the most successful among East
European countries in attracting investors from abroad. Poland was
very successful in attracting mostly small investment, each
27. Decree of the President of the USSR on Foreign Investment, translated in PECHOTA, supra
note 1.
28. The Enterprise with Foreign Property Participation Act (as amended 1990), translated in
PECHOTA, supra note 1.
29. Act XXIV of 1988 on Foreign Investment in Hungary, translated in PfCHOTA, supra note
1.
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frequently less than U.S. $100,000, and several big western
corporations are currently moving in. Small investors frequently
exploited the over-valuation of hard currencies in the Polish
market. This made investment possible with an unbelievably small
amount of capital.
2. The New Polish Law
Newly-drafted Polish laws eliminate restrictions typical of Law
on Economic Activity with the Participation of Foreign Parties
(Foreign Investment Law of 1988), indicated above in Part V.A.
Foreign investment does not require any special permit with the
exception of some restricted areas,"0 unless such a permit is not
required for Polish subjects, as in cases of insurance or banking
businesses. There is no upper or lower limit on foreign investment,
nor is there a limit on repatriation of profits abroad. These laws
have been clearly designed with Hungarian regulation on foreign
investment in mind. The change in law also reflects the Polish
assumption that the restructure of the Polish economy requires
foreign investment of at least U.S. $10 billion. It also displays the
assumption that a free market should have a minimum amount of
restrictions both for domestic and foreign investors. For Eastern
Europe, it is a new approach, a consequence of the attempt to
totally overhaul their economy and to seek membership in the
European Community.
Questions emerge as to whether Polish society shares that
approach to foreign investment. Certainly it does not. Some fear
that the extensive sale of government property to foreign investors
may lead to a modem type of colonization. Employees frequently
fear for their job security. Communist education in mistrust of
foreigners and to private economic activity is visible, particularly
among older generations or people expressing postcommunist,
utopian socialist ideologies.
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30. Restricted areas include harbors, real estate, trade, and the defense industry.
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VI. CONCLUSION
With some generalization, the attitude towards foreign
investment is sometimes based on fear. Some fear that foreign
investment will come in and take over the entire economy; some
fear that foreign investment will not come, leaving Eastern Europe
as a kind of economic cancer. Fortunately for Eastern Europe,
xenophobic fears are diminishing, and with foreign investment
slowly moving in, fears about economic failure seem to be
unjustified. Progress in negotiations on treaties relating to
association with the European Community is also an optimistic
sign, potentially giving easy access to the single largest market
emerging in the world today.
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